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INTRODUCTION
idiot (n.) early 14c., "person so mentally deficient as to be incapable of ordinary reasoning;" … from Greek idiotes [ἰδιώτης] … literally [a] "private person" (as opposed to one taking part in public affairs), used patronizingly for "ignorant person," from idios [ἴδιος] "one's own".
(Etymology online dictionary, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?allowed_in_frame=0&search=idiot, last accessed 20/04/2017)
The negative social consequences of the recent economic crisis both united and divided Europe, through a Janus-faced reaction to the increased levels of inequality, unemployment, poverty and homelessness. One side of Europe's Janus-faced response to the crisis bears the beautiful form of compassion, charity and philanthropy; the other side, however, bears the ugly form of hate, xenophobia, racism and neo-nationalism. The rise in charity/philanthropy has become the object of academic enquiry (Kohl-Arenas, 2017) , whilst recent research has also offered critical insight on the relationship between (post)-welfare state practices and the rise of racism and xenophobia (Demmers and Mehendale 2010; Simonsen, 2015; Dufour, 2015; Dalakoglou 2013; Kaika 2015; Fredrickson 2002; Goldberg 2009; Lentin and Titley 2011) .
In this paper, however, I go beyond the charity/philanthropy vs. racism/xenophobia dualism, and argue that these seemingly antithetical responses have more in common than we may like to think. First, I argue, they are both equally divisive and 'othering' practices: on one hand, xenophobia and racism transform human beings into de-humanized entities in order to fear or hate them (Haldru, Koefoed and Simonsen 2006) ; on the other hand, compassion (in the form of philanthropy or charity) transforms human beings into dependent objects in order to offer aid and help (Tsalikoglou, 2012) . Second, I argue, both racism and charity are strongly a-ffective, but ultimately a-political reactions of people who became imbued with fear and insecurity, as social solidarity and welfare provision was transformed from a collective responsibility into a private affair.
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off an increasingly higher percentage of labour and income to private loans and mortgage contracts. This acted as a biopolitical tool that enrolled the bodies and livelihoods of the workforce into speculative financial mechanisms (Garcia-Lamarca and Kaika 2016) . The biopolitics of fear and insecurity generated by this process turned citizens from political subjects, into fear/insecurity imbued indebted objects who lost their political agency. It turned political subjects (actively caring for the commons and the political life of the polis) into 'idiots' (a-political fear/insecurity imbued, indebted objects (Lazzarato 2007) ) who care only for the matters related to their private household). This, I argue, accounts for the degradation of solidarity politics into expressions of affect (positive or negative).
Understanding the biopolitics of privatized welfare and increased household debt as the process that drives the de-politicization of citizens and their transformation into 'idiots', (i.e. into private persons who can only care for private matters), allows to better contextualise both racism and charity as the affective yet apolitical reactions to the socio-economic consequences of the crisis. It also allows to make a distinction between instances of racism or charity (understood here as affective reactions), and acts of solidarity (understood as political praxis).
The argument in this paper draws upon quantitative and qualitative data from research conducted over the past 5 years on the economic crisis (Kaika 2012; Kaika and Karaliotas 2014) , financialisation as a 'lived' process (Kaika and Ruggiero 2016) , and the biopolitics of debt (Garcia Lamarca and Kaika 2016 And, might there be something that charity and racism -these seemingly antithetical reactions to the crisis -share in common?
What I argue in the following sections is that, although charity and racism are perceived as the antipodes of the European citizens' reaction to the crisis, they actually have more in common than we may like to think. Because they are strongly a-ffective, but ultimately apolitical reactions. I argue that they are both affective reflexes of citizens who have lost their political agency out of fear and insecurity, as they experience social solidarity and welfare provision across Europe being metamorphosed from a collective responsibility into a private matter (Crouch, 2009) ; (Terranova 2015) . Charity and racism are affective but apolitical reactions of people who turned from active citizens (caring for political life and common affairs) into 'idiots', i.e. into private individuals caring only for their private affairs, through the need to find increasingly complex forms of personal compensation for the erosion of collective welfare provision.
Turning citizens into 'idiots' through the biopolitics of debt: how the metamorphosis of welfare into a private matter produced Europe's Janus faced citizen.
The political economic and social implications of the recent crisis and of the related decline of the welfare state across Europe after the 1980s are well documented (Dorling 2014) ; (Finlayson, 2009) ; (Crouch, 2009) (Kunzmann 2016; Dalakoglou and Vradis 2011) (Koutrolikou 2016). The decision to end the Post War European social contract for welfare provision was coupled by the populist promise made by European leaders after the 1980s
(from Thatcher to Blair, from Sarkozy to Aznar, Papandreou, and Gongalez) to make everybody middle class. The decline of welfare provision was linked to the ideology that the expanding European middle classes would no longer be dependent on state welfare as they would be able to buy their own welfare provision through easy and 'cheap' access to private credit. Although this articles focuses on Europe, a similar process took place across the western world. With the rise of creditocracy (Ross 2017 ) and what Soederberg (2013) aptly terms the debtfare state, everyone was promised tailor made access to better housing, healthcare, education etc. through the simple act of signing private loans or mortgage contracts or simply by getting a credit card..
Private debt contracts (loans, credit cards, etc) and mortgage contracts played a major role in enabling and mobilizing this process that metamorphosed welfare into a private affair (Crouch 2009; Garcia-Lamarca and Kaika 2016) and after the 1980s became a key tool for turning European citizens from political beings with equal and universal access to welfare provision, into indebted subjects (Lazzarato 2007) , or private welfare investors (Langley, 2008) , 'free' to manage their own welfare choices. This way, the exponential increase in household debt across Europe became a biopolitical tool that turned European citizens into private investors (see also Sequera and Janoschka 2012 on neoliberal globalisation and citizenship). After the 1980s, the ability of European citizens to house themselves, be healthy, educated, have children or not, care for the elderly etc. became increasingly dependent upon the extent to which they are prepared to sign off significant parts of their current and future labour to private debt contracts; the extent to which they were prepared to 'mortgage' their lives and enrol their current and future labour, bodies and animals, into mere animals --to use the Aristotelian analogy. That is, into beings who are prepared to renounce and eventually lose their ability to reason, to make laws, and to enter a process of political subjectivisation. What distinguishes men from animals, according to Aristotle, is that animals cannot make laws and reason politically. Animals can scream out loud their private sufferings in public, but they cannot act politically. Animals can be affective; but they cannot be political.
I argue that understanding the process through which our lives became 'mortgaged' (GarciaLamarca and Kaika 2016), the ways in which our labour and our bodies became intimately entangled in the web of global financial speculative practices in order to continue accessing what used to be our collective welfare commons, is central for contextualizing both xenophobia and charity as the deeply affective but ultimately apolitical reactions to this crisis.
Charity and xenophobia are the Janus faced affective reactions of millions of people across Europe who lost their political subjectivity to biopolitical practices of indebtedness. Citizens who compromised their political agency and their power to make decisions over their future when they were forced to forge an intimate relationship between speculative practices of global financial institutions and their bodies, their labour, and their lives by signing up to private loans or mortgages.
The debt that both unites and divides Europeans: translating household debt figures into everyday practices as a means to go beyond false North/South divisions.
The fear and insecurity that stems from biopolitical practices of indebtedness both unites and divides citizens across Europe today (Vercellone 2015) . Because, although the current debt crisis is presented as a southern European crisis (Fumagalli & Lucarelli, 2015) , if we shift focus from public debt to household debt, the picture changes dramatically. (Eurostat, 2015) . In fact, the countries that found themselves in the thick of the economic crisis hold some of the lowest household debt ratios (Portugal at 151. If we translate the above numbers into everyday practices, they mean that from the European North to the European South, the majority of households have signed off significant parts of their current and future labour and decision making capacity in advance to debt repayments, in order to purchase their welfare in the form of housing, education, healthcare, or other forms of welfare credits. It means that all of a sudden, the exchange rates of the Japanese yen and the Swiss franc, the interest rates of the European Central Bank, the inflation or deflation of global real estate markets became factors determining our ability to house ourselves, to be healthy, educated, to have children, to care for the elderly, et cetera.
The shock of absolute identification: Europe's middle class precariat, torn between compassion and racism.
It is precisely this indebted, politically discredited man/woman that has become Europe's new Janus. Europe's new Janus can still feel compassion and empathy towards the homeless families in Spain or Greece. In fact, being charitable and philanthropic is gratifying, as it affirms that s/he is still a human being (Kaika 2012 ). But at the same time s/he is afraid.
She/he is afraid not only that she/he might be called upon to pay part of the debt of "the other" (i.e. the Greek, the Spaniard, the Irish, etc.); most of all Europe's Janus faced wo/man Pre-Publication Draft Page 11 Kaika, Maria (2017) "Between compassion and racism: how the biopolitics of neoliberal welfare turns citizens into affective 'idiots'. " European Planning Studies DOI: 10.1080/09654313.2017.1320521 is afraid that s/he might any moment be in exactly the same position as the Greek the Irish or the Spaniard.
The shock that images of poverty and homelessness in the European south induce to the European North is not the same as the shock induced when faced with the sufferings of a marginalised 'other' a subaltern subject; instead, this is the shock of absolute identification.
The average English, Norwegian, Finnish, Dutch middle class citizen knows very well that the 300,000 evicted families in Spain look a lot like him/her. They are people who like him/her had secure jobs, decent incomes, and homes they could call their own. They are people who, like him/her, got access to a better life by signing up the promise made after the 1980s and 1990s by Blair, Sarkozy, González, Aznar, Mitterrand, Chirac, Papandreou; a promise to make everybody middle class by signing up to private loans and mortgages.
Of course, the political promise for a better life is not new. The same promise was offered across the western world in the years that followed the Second World War (Smart 2011).
With a significant difference: that earlier promise made access to housing, education, healthcare, and general welfare a collective responsibility. It was a promise offered on the basis of an increase in public deficit and rendered the whole of the society co-responsible for its materialisation. By contrast, the more recent promise was offered on the basis of expanding private deficit, and household debt. This promise instituted everybody as credit worthy so that everybody could get access to a system of "asset based welfare" (Finlayson, 2009 ) that turned welfare into a personal responsibility. So, the real promise that was given by Bush, Blair, Sarkozy, Mitterrand, Aznar, etc., was not a promise to make everybody middle-class. It was a promise to make everybody deeply indebted. And it was a promise that was delivered in full, as shown in the previous section. In 2007 alone, banks in Spain to hire assassins; we can hire the bailiff [to do the same job] for us." (Brecht, 1971 ):
50-51; author's own translation).
I argue that the fear induced by the violence of financial capitalism is precisely what both unites and divides us across Europe. The austerity induced humanitarian crisis that the European south experiences is the 'invasion of the real' (Žižek, 1989 ) that shutters the promise for perpetual debt-derived middle class prosperity through privately purchased welfare; a promise upon which neoliberalism fed and thrived over the last decades. This invasion of the real exposed the European middle classes for what they really are: a proletariat indebted for life to its creditors as their current and future labour is packaged and sold in the form of financial products and global vehicles of securitization and financial speculation; a middle class precariat for whom the production and reproduction of their mortgaged lives is heavily dependent upon their ability to service their debt under increasingly volatile circumstances (see Neilson & Rossiter, 2008) . This is a new form of feudalism where the European so called 'middle classes' owe a significant part of their current and future labour in advance to the landlord as surf labour (Baudrillard, 1975) ; only the landlord in this case takes the form of global financial institutions. This state of indebtendness is something akin to an anthropological disaster where active citizens and political subjects turn into indebted objects.
The process through which the embeddedness of livelihood in global financial speculative practices through debt produces proletarianiased bodies is not some kind of plot from the part of an invisible superstructure; it is an essential part of the 'economic infrastructure' and institutions of capitalism (Deleuze & Guattari, 1984) .
Beyond affect: solidarity as a political act … or … how fighting for the commons can avoid an anthropological catastrophe.
In this paper I argued that understanding the condition of the indebted European middle class precariat and examining the intimate relationship developed between livelihoods and financial institutions as citizens are forced to become private welfare investors is central in order to contextualise the strong reactions to the recent economic crisis: charity and xenophobia.
As noted earlier, although charity and xenophobia may appear to be standing at the opposite ends of the spectrum, they are in fact part of the same Janus faced strongly affective, but ultimately a-political and deeply divisive practices. As I argued earlier, both xenophobia and charity have to 'other', in order to allocate hatred or support respectively.
It is only after I objectify the other as a lesser human being, that I can hate them. But it is also only after I objectify the other as a dependent entity that I can offer charity or philanthropy (Tsalikoglou, 2012) . Whilst xenophobia transforms human beings into dehumanized entities in order to be able to hate them, charity transforms human beings into dependent objects in order to be able to offer aid thus reproducing relations of power (Kohl-Arenas 2017). There are numerous groups and organizations across Europe today that offer charity and aid; equally, there are numerous groups that promote xenophobia and hatred. But there are preciously few that go beyond affect and down the dirt-path of instituting methods and practices of solidarity.
Solidarity is not an affective act; it is political praxis; it is the generation of radical imaginaries for social change (Castoriadis 1987) and -importantly-the generation of new methods to institutionalise these radical imaginaries; methods that can promote rupture with previous subject positions and disentangle the thread of life from the web of financial transactions. In academic terms, a search for a politics and praxis of and for solidarity would be very close to Cindi Katz's conceptualization of minor theory, as "not a theory of the margins, but a different way of working with material" (Katz 1996: 489) .
At the aftermath of the occupy protests, many groups -less numerous but arguably more important politically-emerged across Europe, whose focus goes beyond mere protests against marginalisation or against austerity politics (Calvaro Velegrakis and Kaika 2017) . Third, by physically blocking evictions through forming a strong human barrier against bailiffs and police forces, often facing the raw violence of riot police. Activist photographers and filmmakers are also in situ. The PAH establishes home dispossessions and evictions as a collective problem. And enacts anti-evictions activism as a collective social practice, not a private affair. Fourth, the PAH performs housing as a right for all, by occupying empty buildings owned by banks and actively re-housing evicted families in these buildings, thus taking back the right to housing as soon as it is taken away. In short, the PAH actively promotes a process that not only re-houses, but also re-dignifies evicted citizens, through a deep seated process of politicisation that changes how citizens define themselves. The PAH's actions are based on the understanding that any pleads with the state or banks to reregulate debt repayments, or prolong the right to stay in repossessed homes would be nothing but an affirmation of both indebted evicted citizens as powerless objects, and the The second movement I want to bring into this discussion in order to exemplify emerging practices of solidarity that go beyond affect is the coalition against the privatisation of the water and sewage company of Thessaloniki in Greece. The coalition was initiated by the water company's trade union (SEEYATH), when the profit making public company was identified as one of the assets that the Greek state could sell in order to raise funds for debt repayments. The trade union's initial protests soon widened out to a broader coalition of citizens and groups, notably "SOSte to NERO" and "Initiative 136" (henceforth K136). These two groups went way beyond mere protests against privatisation. They produced new imaginaries that changed radically the framework for negotiating water as a right. K136 asked citizens to contribute 136 euros each towards buying back the water commons when they came up for sale. By doing so, K136 generated a radical imaginary that turned citizen's purchasing power into autonomous capital flows that could claim the commons (water) back, as soon as it was snatched away. By doing so, the water coalition (like the PAH) contributed towards redefining the role of citizens; no longer as the powerless indebted objects living in a bankrupt country (Greece) with no choice other than to forfeit their commons (water in this case) in order to be delivered from personal or national debt (see The radical imaginary as the key difference between charity and solidarity: the importance of the quality of ruins and of failing better next time.
As xenophobia and hate are on the rise across Europe, this is a mature moment to distinguish between, on one hand, affective acts and protests of charity/hatred or 'animal cries' of private suffering, and on the other hand movements that generate new radical imaginaries of solidarity, but which also produce methods to institute these as collective imaginaries and perform new subject positions (Smart 2011) . Because only groups that can overcome the fear to institute their radical imaginaries as social practices (Castoriadis 1987) can produce history . And overcoming the fear of instituting new imaginaries means overcoming the fear of failing. It means accepting that our self-defined beautiful revolutionary selves may become bruised, scratched, scathed and wrinkled and our beautiful revolutionary ideas may become less perfect once put into practice. Indeed, both the PAH and the water coalition have already undergone traumatic processes of internal conflict and split-ups. It is the role of scholarship in planning and urban studies to amplify these voices (Siemiatycki, M and Siemiatycki, E 2016) .
For even if their imaginaries for instituting a new collective right to housing or water become bruised as they become praxis, their transformative power rests not in how well these movements will succeed in delivering their goals in full; their transformative power rests in in how gracefully they can eventually fail; in the legacies they leave behind if/when their militancy withers away. Like the quality of any great edifice or idea, the quality of these emerging radical imaginaries will be best judged by their ruins. Because ruins are testimonies that something has been real and therefore political.
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It is this quality (the political) that distinguishes these political initiatives from countless affective initiatives emerging across Europe (in the form of charity or racism) (Lorey 2014) .
Even if/when their militancy withers away, the Spanish PAH and the Greek citizens' water coalition will still have put into gear a process of subject formation that challenges the social fatalism that followed the recent crisis; a process that can become a generative force for a broader transformation that will prevent an Anthropological catastrophe. They will have contributed towards disentangling the web of life from its direct dependency on capital flows.
If we take seriously Hanah Arendt's (1998) or Cornelius Castoriadis ' (1987) arguments that history is the creation of new meanings and new social imaginaries, there is no better moment than now to overcome fear and follow Samuel Beckett's (Beckett, 1983) command:
if you have failed, try again, and fail again. But try to fail better next time. Today, during times of wide spreading fear, insecurity, hatred and crisis, radical imaginaries stop being just abstract intellectual exercises. They become a social necessity.
